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At least since the 1980s, U.S. efforts to control unauthorized crossings of its southwest border have rested on the idea of deterrence -- if migrants know that a border is difficult and dangerous to cross, they will be dissuaded from trying in the first place. Despite the seemingly intuitive logic of this strategy, U.S. efforts have not been successful. Though billions of dollars have been spent on this deterrence strategy, it has failed to reach its policy objectives. Unauthorized crossings have persisted under both Republican and Democratic administrations, peaking first during the Clinton and Bush administrations, then spiking again under Obama and Trump, and, most recently, under Biden. All have attempted variations of the same strategy with little evidence of the long-term success of the approach.
In this paper, we highlight the flawed logic of the deterrence strategy through analysis of those who are undeterred - individuals from Central America with previous migration experience who have direct knowledge of the difficulties and dangers a border-crossing poses and yet report plans to try again. To do so, we analyze survey data at two different points in time, the summers of 2014 and 2022, when migration from the northern Central American countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras peaked. We argue that migration intentions are not shaped by perceptions that the journey will be unsuccessful, dangerous, or lead to detention at the border. Consequently, policies that seek to shape such perceptions are not likely to act as an effective deterrent among potential migrants who are most knowledgeable about these dangers and chances for success. Conversely, perceptions of the dangers of migration are most consequential among those least likely to migrate in the first place. It is this critical question of who is most, and least, affected by a deterrence strategy that we seek to answer in this paper through an in-depth analysis of survey data of potential migrants in these northern Central American countries.