Playing with Fire: The Environmental Consequences of the License to Burn

• In Event: Remote Sensing and the Political Economy of Development

Abstract

Why do governments with poor environmental records keep winning elections? Research in political science shows that, although voters around the world care about ecological issues, they still either punish representatives for pro-environmental policies or fail to hold them accountable for degrading the environment. What explains this puzzle? We argue that some anti-environmental policies impose both negative externalities and concentrated benefits. When these affect the same constituencies, short-term economic gains may supersede environmental costs. To test our argument, we analyze the environmental and electoral impacts of the Supreme Decree 3973 of July 2019 in Bolivia, which promoted the expansion of the agricultural frontier in the Santa Cruz and Beni departments through controlled fires. To do so, we employ a quasi-experimental, difference-in-discontinuity design, novel micro-level land tenure data, and fine-grained satellite imagery. We find that the decree led to a large increase in the number and intensity of fires, the rates of deforestation, and the concentration of atmospheric carbon monoxide in the affected departments. We also show that most of the environmental impacts of the decree are driven by both campesino and large private properties as well as lands owned by the state. Finally, although our analysis points to a sizable effect of the decree on the electoral support for MAS, this association is driven by increasing support in opposition strongholds prior to the decree.

Authors

• Kathryn Baragwanath, Australian Catholic University

• Cesar B. Martinez-Alvarez, University of California, Santa Barbara

• Yifan He, University of California, Santa Barbara