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In today’s era of elite partisan polarization, it is rare for members of Congress to act against the wishes of their party leaders. When these moments occur, they present an important opportunity for scholars of legislative behavior to investigate the motivations behind party disloyalty. In this project, I explore the effects of ideology and electoral incentives on members’ decisions to buck their party. Using a variety of data sources including roll call voting data, election results, and text data containing newsletters and floor speeches, I investigate multiple means by which members can express disloyalty, and I argue that members display disloyalty in different ways depending on their ideology and whether they are most vulnerable to a primary or general election challenge in the next election. I then explore the normative implications of party disloyalty for elite level polarization and the health of democracy in the United States.