Resolve, Credibility, and Reputation in Multidimensional Bargaining

• In Event: Advances in Bargaining Models of War

Abstract

How does a state’s decision to fight in one context affect others’ beliefs about its willingness to fight in another context? The voluminous theoretical literature on signaling, reputation, and resolve has not adequately grappled with the widely-accepted notion that a state’s willingness to fight over an issue depends on both dispositional factors like cost sensitivity and situational factors like the subjective importance of the issue at stake. I address this gap by integrating both types of resolve into a dynamic bargaining game over multiple issues. In the model, fighting over issue A can sometimes signal high resolve over issue B by demonstrating high cost tolerance. Under other conditions, however, fighting reveals a lack of resolve because resources diverted to the fight over issue A signal that issue B is relatively unimportant. Broadly, the model reveals the difficulty and contingency of using aggressive foreign policies to signal resolve across domains. Conversely, more accommodating foreign policies can sometimes clearly signal resolve. Indeed, under a wide range of parameter values, fighting over one issue can perfectly signal either high or low resolve on another issue, depending on the adversary’s prior beliefs. I highlight the model’s implications with brief empirical illustrations drawn from across the Cold War.

Author

• Kyle Haynes, Purdue University