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This paper advances a new theory to explain variation in the type of coercive institutions that autocrats rely on to manage social unrest, by examining the conditions under which autocrats delegate repressive authority away from national military forces towards local police forces. When making deployment decisions, I argue that autocrats face a tradeoff between the local knowledge, embeddedness, and experience of local actors, and the greater technical capacity and coordination abilities of national forces. I theorize that the way autocrats resolve this tradeoff depends on the nature of mass-based threats faced by the regime, ranging from street protests to clandestine insurgencies, organized either locally or nationally. I test this theory by leveraging variation in the intensity and nature of mass-based threats in authoritarian Argentina between 1966-1973 and 1976-1983. Findings based on extensive archival research reveal shifts in the deployment of coercive institutions in response to varied threats. These findings contribute to our understanding of authoritarian repression and offer insights into the micro-dynamics of conflict at the sub-national level.