The Paradox of Extended Deterrence and Nuclear Armament

• In Event: Nuclear Deterrence

Abstract

Extended deterrence has two goals. One is to deter allies’ adversaries, and the other is to maintain non-proliferation policy by preventing allies from arming themselves with nuclear weapons. To accomplish these goals, the United States has provided extended deterrence to its allies, such as NATO, Japan, and South Korea.

Conventional wisdom suggests that the higher the credibility of the extended deterrence provider (the U.S.), the lower the support for nuclear armament among extended deterrence recipient countries (U.S. allies). This is because the recipient states believe that they receive sufficient security guarantees from the provider. If so, the public support for nuclear armament in the recipient states should also be low since the credibility of extended deterrence is high.

To test this, this study surveyed 1,000 South Korean citizens every month for 18 months. During this period, the U.S. and South Korea made various efforts to increase the credibility and effectiveness of extended deterrence, including establishing the Nuclear Consultative Group, deploying U.S. strategic assets, and conducting joint military exercises. However, the survey finds that despite these efforts to increase the effectiveness of extended deterrence, support for nuclear armament in Korea has increased. In particular, support for nuclear armament among conservative South Koreans who support the U.S.-ROK alliance was higher than that of liberals. By analyzing the survey results quantitatively and qualitatively, this study reexamines the relationship between the credibility of extended deterrence and nuclear armament.

Author

• Suon Choi, Georgia Institute of Technology