Authoritarian Regional Aid and the Stability of Authoritarian Regimes

• In Event: Democratic Erosion and Resistance: Domestic to International Factors 2

Abstract

What determines the allocation of aid and lending from autocratic regional financial organizations? Well-developed literatures on the determinants of bilateral aid and aid from organizations led by democracies weigh the role of recipient need, economic interests of donors, and geostrategic interests, but largely overlook authoritarian multilateral lending. In this article, we investigate whether authoritarian regional lending follows similar logics, and whether it appears to target politically vulnerable authoritarian regimes. Using a new dataset of financing from fifteen regional financial organizations with predominantly authoritarian members, we find that authoritarian-led organizations do disproportionately lend to highly authoritarian states. We also find suggestive evidence that authoritarian regional lending supports political stabilization of vulnerable authoritarian regimes.

Authors

• Christina Cottiero, University of Utah

• Christina J. Schneider, University of California, San Diego