Informational Advantages and Bureaucratic Resistance to Democratic Backsliding

• In Event: State Informational Capacity in Historical and Contemporary Governance

Abstract

Despite their reputations as unaccountable actors, bureaucrats have in some contexts emerged as important sources of resistance to aspiring autocratic leaders. This paper examines how and to what extent information asymmetries between bureaucrats and politicians shapes the bureaucrats’ responses to executive aggrandizement. I hypothesize that in contexts of high information capacity, bureaucrats are better positioned to constrain executive overreach. Specifically, high information capacity leads to informational advantages that enable bureaucrats to either slow or sabotage undemocratic agendas or learn about and expose abuses of power. I test this argument with multiple research methods including cross-national quantitative analysis using data on state informational capacity, bureaucratic discretion, and democratic backsliding and case studies of specific acts of resistance. The paper contributes new knowledge about bureaucratic behavior and bureaucratic institutions as a source of democratic resilience.

Author

• Rachel Sigman, University of Denver