Exploring the US Public's Nuclear War Risk Perceptions in the Post-Cold War Era

• In Event: Public Opinion and Nuclear Weapons

Abstract

The decision to develop nuclear weapons in the 1940s was heavily influenced by the belief that the Germans were making progress toward their own nuclear bomb and, therefore, the perceived and actual risk of nuclear use during World War II. Since then, policies surrounding deterrence and nuclear weapons have been influenced by real and perceived risks of nuclear weapons use, as well as conventional conflict, among other factors. These risk perceptions can drive restraint and cooperation in avoiding conflict or may cause a state to make threats or improve or expand its nuclear arsenal. These decisions are primarily made in response to policy elites' risk perceptions and evaluations of the global security environment. However, the public’s risk perceptions are also crucial to understanding these policy decisions, particularly in democratic states.

While the public rarely plays a direct role in nuclear decision-making, risk perceptions can impact support for political candidates or policy. Nuclear weapons and deterrence policies can make the public feel safer, while increased nuclear threat rhetoric from other states can make the public feel less safe. Increased perceptions of risk may influence the public to push for improvements in the nuclear stockpile or, conversely, push for a reduction in arms, as demonstrated in The Nuclear Freeze campaign in the 1980s. This is because public views can constrain or enable elected officials to undertake costly policy initiatives, such as nuclear weapons programs. For example, if risk perceptions are low, then voters are less likely to support a candidate who wants to greatly increase investments in the nuclear security enterprise. Furthermore, elected officials must balance these views with the actual threat environment and our obligations to our allies, demonstrating the complicated “two-level” game officials must play.

While US public concern for nuclear war decreased following the end of the Cold War, the post-Cold War Era has been marked by non-nuclear and nuclear-related national security focusing events that may increase or decrease nuclear war risk perceptions and thus impact the public’s nuclear policy preferences. In recent years, the public salience of nuclear weapons and the risk perceptions of nuclear weapons use have fluctuated in response to events such as Russia’s nuclear threats, North Korean tests, China’s demonstrated desire to modernize and add to its stockpile, and even pop culture such as the movie Oppenheimer. This leads to the following questions: How have the US public’s perceptions of nuclear risk changed during the post-Cold War Era? What is the impact of national security focusing events on risk perceptions?

This paper will explore the US public’s perceptions of the risk of nuclear war between the US and other states (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) between 1993 and 2023 using data from the National Security Survey conducted by the Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis. The survey is a nationally representative survey of US adults, conducted every other year from 1993 to 2005 and then annually from 2005 to 2023. To evaluate the impact of national security-focused events on risk perceptions, a timeline of salient national security and nuclear-related events will be developed and used to conduct a time series analysis. These events include but are not limited to, nuclear arms treaty signings and withdrawls, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, and North Korean nuclear tests.

Author

• Kaitlin Peach, University of Oklahoma