Opportunistic Legibility: Private Telecommunications Networks and Surveillance

• In Event: International Political Economy of Technological Change

Abstract

How do states leverage privately-operated communications infrastructure for foreign intelligence collection? In recent years, fears that China may use telecommunications networks built by companies like Huawei as a “backdoor” for foreign surveillance have become a major flash point in China-West relations. But despite widespread suspicions, governments have not provided hard evidence of such behavior. We look to the long history of states using telecoms infrastructure for intelligence collection to assess the basis for these concerns. First, we conceptualize telecommunications infrastructure as “dual-use intelligence infrastructure,” which we define as infrastructural forms that can serve both commercial and surveillance functions. We then develop the idea of opportunistic legibility, building on James C. Scott’s influential concept of legibility. Rather than develop their own in-house classification and information collection schemes, states pursuing opportunistic legibility exploit existing sources of data from private individuals and firms to render social and political life more legible. Second, through qualitative analysis of key historical cases – including the U.K., U.S., and Germany’s use of subsea telegraph cables before World War I and U.S. surveillance activities after 9/11 – we develop a typology of the ways states manipulate state-firm relations to enable this opportunistic legibility practice. Third, we apply this typology and what is known about state-business relations in China to assess the case against Huawei. We find that there is some overlap between China and historical cases, but important differences pose problems for alarmist views. The paper deepens our understanding of the multiform ways states pursue legibility and contributes to research on state-business relations in the political economy of security.

Authors

• Austin Carson, University of Chicago

• John David Minnich, Massachussetts Institute of Technology