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This research design explores the intricate dynamics of political maneuvering within the unique context of Brazilian Coalition Presidentialism, spanning from 1999 to 2021. Focusing on three key strategies—politicization, politically aligned ministerial appointments, and the strategic deployment of politicized individuals—the research explores their collective influence on public procurement procedures. At its core, the investigation hinges on the concept of “coalition distributive politics” by examining the interplay between federal funds, party alignments, and individual government procurement transactions. Therefore, the question here is whether or not politicization induces noncompetitive procurement procedures in Brazil? The study posits two hypotheses: firstly, that heightened politicization correlates with an increased adoption of non-competitive procurement procedures, and secondly, that such politicized institutions are more inclined to award contracts to firms with a history of campaign donations to the president's party. This research intends to contribute to the exploration of the interconnections between coalition politics, presidential strategies, and public procurement outcomes in Brazil.