Power, Discourse, and Democracy in Plato’s “Theaetetus”

• In Event: Plato, Philosophy, and Democracy

Abstract

Scholars have long argued that the tension between philosophy and democracy in Plato’s thought leads him to disdain the latter. For instance, in the Republic Socrates apparently critiques democracy for empowering those who are incapable of contemplating being understood as ideas or forms. Relativism, therefore, is natural to citizens of democratic regimes. In their quest for freedom and equality, democrats reject stable essences or qualities to impose their own meanings onto the world. In this paper I will argue that the connection between democracy and relativism is also evident in Plato’s Theaetetus. In this dialogue Socrates explores the thesis that knowledge is perception. He argues that if correct, it would entail the Heracleitean thesis that all things are in flux and the Protagorean thesis that “man is the measure of all things;” things are simply as they appear to the human subject perceiving them. The connection to democracy is twofold: it suggests that all opinions are “true” and hence that all are equally wise, and the sovereignty of the people over the definition of justice that will rule them; justice is simply what different peoples in different cities say it is. Yet, Socrates shows that knowledge as perception, although suited to it, poses serious problems for democracy as well. First, speech would end if one could say of anything “so” and “not so” at the same time, as words would lose their meaning and we would be reduced to silence. Second, thinking would end as, being nothing other than the soul speaking to itself, if one could think things both beautiful and ugly, just and unjust, true and false at the same time, things would lose their meaning and we would be reduced to ignorance. What Socrates is pointing to, I will argue, is that in democracies relativism threatens a coercive politics, as different and dissimilar groups seek to dominate each other by imposing their own meanings onto the polity; speech is understood as an expression of power not of truth. Atypical of most scholars, therefore, I will conclude by suggesting that one reason Plato may develop or elaborate on an understanding of being as ideas or forms is not to condemn democracy, but rather to help prevent its slide into a coercive politics. Denying both the Hercleitean and Protagorean theses, the ideas mitigate against relativism and suggest that speech can reveal the truth. The ideas, therefore, hold out the potential to maintain a discursive form of politics in which diversity is addressed not through domination but rather an inclusion that shared meanings can allow.

Author

• Ann Ward, Baylor University