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Do electoral reforms impact redistribution? In most countries, women's suffrage represented the single largest expansion of the eligible electorate, yet scholars have come to different conclusions about the impact that suffrage had on public spending. We build a theory of the relationship between suffrage, electoral institutions, and social spending by linking the distinct scholarships on how electoral systems affect redistribution and the gender turnout gap. We argue that women's suffrage should shift the median voter's preferences, either because women are poorer on average than men or because women want a different set of policies from governments than men. If parties are responsive to these changes, then social spending should increase in areas that parties believe women voters care about. But if party responsiveness is mediated by their need to respond, that is, by the power of organized women, then we should see larger policy changes when women are more electorally powerful. Proportional representation systems (PR) can make women more electorally powerful because they breed higher competition, entry of left parties, and because women turn out at higher rates. We study these dynamics by examining changes in education spending in Norway, which offers a unique setting where both electoral systems and the timing of suffrage expansion varied across the more than 600 municipalities during the 1898-1920 period. By using a novel data set on education spending, party seat shares, and the women's suffrage movement, the study shows how electoral institutions can mediate women's influence over policy.