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This paper uses a panel survey carried out in Russia before and after the invasion of Ukraine to study how Vladimir Putin’s popular support base has changed since the beginning of the war. Drawing on the comparative politics literature, we examine various explanations of popular support for dictators. We find support for many of the key arguments in this literature. In December 2021, on the eve of war, support for Putin was associated with an admixture of economic performance evaluations, patriotic sentiment, ideological affinity, state dependence and media diet. Many of these factors remained relevant in 2023, but the broadening of his support coalition following the war led to a weakening of some of these relationships–especially on economic policy positions—as more politically disengaged individuals switched their support to Putin. On the whole we find that Putin’s wartime coalition is not a social, ideological, or attitudinal monolith. It is a melange. And while some of Putin’s support is deep-rooted, much is not.