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Can involvement from international actors spur the implementation of peace processes after civil wars? Most studies, at present, investigate this question by looking at the effects of material incentives on third parties, as well as the presence of peacekeeping operations. Instead, this manuscript looks for evidence of second image reversed type of mechanisms. Using original data, it looks at the efforts of governments involved in civil wars to achieve direct, unfiltered communication with foreign publics and elites to promote a narrative favorable to themselves---that is, to engage in public diplomacy campaigns (PDCs) in the US. When governments engaged in civil wars reach out to foreign publics and elites directly to share their point of view, they may become emboldened, calculating that external support is more likely. Under these conditions, such governments may confront a situation of moral hazard in which they will be incentivized to offer fewer concessions to rebels in negotiations than would otherwise be the case, in anticipation of future material support. To test this claim, data on PDCs in the US following the Cold War is collected. Using the PAM dataset to measure the degree to which peace processes are implemented over time, the relationship between PDCs and peace process implementation is assessed. The findings support the theoretical intuition, and carry important implications for studies of foreign interventions, civil war termination, and studies of human rights norms and institutions.