Disproportional Equality: Class Sorting and Formula Effects in List Systems

• In Event: Electoral Systems, Coordination, and Congruence

Abstract

Proportionality in electoral systems is often seen as the best means to produce statistically representative government. In this paper, I argue that majority bonuses—whereby the party that obtains a plurality of votes automatically obtains an absolute majority in the legislature—can bolster the number of statistically atypical working-class candidates that manage to obtain office in PR systems. The difference is mechanically driven, as workers are systematically granted lower placements on party lists. Majority bonuses reduce the number of parties in the legislature, by increasing the number of seats allocated to winning parties. Formula disproportionality thus allows a larger number of workers with low list placements to enter politics. As a test of theory, I present evidence from a natural experiment on a municipality-level change in electoral formulas, which took place in Italy in 1993. Leveraging a difference-in-discontinuities design, I find that the bonus improved working class representation in municipal councils. Effects are driven by a positive change in the proportion of workers that enter councils via winning party lists, and the reform did not affect working-class propensities to obtain executive municipal posts.

Author

• Ari Ray, Univeristy of Geneva