Why Sanctions Backfire

• In Event: Law and Politics in Contemporary Latin America

Abstract

Economic sanctions are often imposed to bring about regime change or induce policy changes. In Iraq, Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Chile, and Russia, for example, economic sanctions were meant to starve the ruling regime of resources and foment protests and unrest. Critics posit that such sanctions are ineffective and may even backfire by creating a rally-around-the-flag effect. I argue that this debate misses a fundamental pitfall of economic sanctions as tools of regime change: the cost of sanctions falls disproportionately on populations opposed to the government, leading them to emigrate; sanctions, then, not only restore but can even bolster the strength of the regime. I use three original data sets to document this dynamic in the Venezuelan case. Sanctions meant to topple Nicolás Maduro instead accelerated the opposition exodus, thereby strengthening the Maduro regime.

Author

• Nicolas Idrobo, University of Pennsylvania