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IOM has taken on an increasingly active role in migration governance (Geiger & Pecoud, 2014; Bradley, Costello, Sherwood, 2023). It provides funding and technical assistance for programmes ranging from returns, border management, data collection to policy development. IOM's work often takes place in the Global South in the context of externalising migration control. Previous research shows how IOM does more than offer logistical support in the policy making process; it pushes a narrative that represents its own interest and that of its – Global North – funders (Geiger, 2010; Korneev, 2014; Bartels, 2017). In this paper we look at two cases that defy the idea that IOM calls the shots; the national migration policies of Kenya and Senegal. IOM has been supporting the policy writing process for several years; in Kenya since 2009, in Senegal since 2016. Yet, both countries are still to validate the policy. The policy context of the two countries shows both similarities and differences that may affect their receptiveness to the efforts of IOM and its funders. Both Senegal and Kenya host IOM the headquarters in their region and both countries are considered important regional players. Their economic position is also similar; both are classified as lower middle-income countries and ODA makes up a considerable share of government spending (around 15% in Kenya and 22% in Senegal). Senegal is an origin and transit country for irregular migrants in the EU making it a longer standing target of EU efforts of the externalization of migration control compared to Kenya. Kenya is an important regional host of refugees and is growing in importance as an origin country for labour migration to the Gulf. To understand why the national policies have been drafted but have since been stalled, the paper draws on policy drafts, IOM documents and elite interviews with national policy makers in Senegal and Kenya. Preliminary findings suggest policy makers in Senegal like to be seen as good partners, but do not see having a new policy framework as a high-level priority. Building on literature on the role of domestic preferences in migration cooperation (Mouthaan 2019, Adam et al 2020), the paper discusses to what extent Senegal and Kenya are exhibiting what Natter, Norman & Stel (2023) have termed “strategic non-regulation”. The paper adds to literature that challenges the reduction of origin countries to rule-takers in migration governance.