The Roots of Revanchism: Russia as a Defeated Great Power

• In Event: Declining Powers and International Conflict

Abstract

Since Russia’s 2022 full invasion of Ukraine, many have focused on the nature of the Putin regime as a uniquely aggressive state while others have argued Western actions and especially NATO expansion pushed Russia toward war. I propose a framework to understand this and other Russian post-Cold War foreign policies that bridges these arguments. While not vanquished on the battlefield but defeated in every other way, viewing Russia as a defeated state similar to past defeated great powers shows Moscow is following a familiar pattern. Defeated states resent all war-ending settlements, no matter how lenient, and act to revise them when they can. Thus, the informal war-ending settlement that followed the Cold War was bound to be an object of resentment and attempted revision no matter its contents.

To test my argument, I develop a measure of the severity of war-ending settlements for all great power wars 1815-1945 and show the dominant response to both lenient and harsh treatment is rejection and attempted revision when opportunities arise due to shifts in power and other factors. Applying this to the post-Cold War era, it’s clear that Russia is not unique in attempting to regain lost status, power, and territory associated with the end of the Cold War.

This argument suggests Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a product of both Russia’s identity as a defeated state and external factors. NATO expansion and related actions, while certainly adding to Russian ire, should thus be evaluated in light of the fact that Russia was likely to act to revise any postwar settlement, no matter how lenient.

Author

• Paul Fritz, Hofstra University