Signals in Security Commitment: Evidence on US-China-Taiwan Relations

• In Event: Public Opinion on War and Peace in Ukraine and Taiwan

Abstract

What influences the sender-receiver gaps in signaling? To address this critical question, I will field experimental surveys to the public in sender (U.S.) and receivers (China and Taiwan). Focusing on the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan, the surveys will investigate the reactions of sender and receivers to signals by three American political actors: the executive, legislature, and voters. I will evaluate how each signal affects the probability of the U.S. militarily defending Taiwan, China attacking Taiwan, and Taiwan declaring independence. The findings will contribute to our understanding of the credibility of international commitments. The study carries implications for the ongoing debates about U.S. policies in managing US-China-Taiwan relations and, more broadly, about international security.

Author

• Hsin-Hsin Pan, Soochow University