More Bark than Bite: Prospective Threats and Retrospective Views

• In Event: Civic Learning on Campus: Bringing Political Science In Mini-Conference III: Local Political Institutions and Citizen Engagement across Cases

Abstract

Re-election seeking politicians are concerned with the threat of voters throwing them out of office based on policy decisions they have made. Voters and interest groups may prospectively signal that a proposed policy they do not like will trigger negative retrospection and risk-averse politicians, unable to observe counterfactual scenarios, may be inclined to oppose the policy. How much of these prospective signals are cheap talk? I investigate this question using public comments made by voters on approvals of development projects at public meetings on projects that have since been completed. Comparing voters who commented on housing approvals to nearby voters who did not, I establish: 1) whether commenters recall their participation, the stance they communicated, and the reasons they provided, 2) whether they noticed the completion of the project they commented only and whether they believe it had the effects they anticipated in their comment, and 3) whether they have changed their evaluation of their city councilor or mayor and their vote intention.

Author

• Alexander Laurence Sahn, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill