Japan’s Proactive and Independent Nuclear Safety Regulator

• In Event: Further Expansion of the Japanese Prime Minister’s Power

Abstract

The diffusion of regulatory agencies has sparked scholarly debate about the factors explaining agency autonomy. This paper examines the emergence of an independent nuclear safety regulator in Japan, which has a tradition of informal and cooperative regulation, where agency independence is rare. Reforms following the March 2011 nuclear accident overhauled Japan’s nuclear safety administration by establishing the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA). Despite low expectations, it was able to establish itself as an independent regulator. To shed light on explanations for the increase in the autonomy of the NRA, this paper draws on different strands of regulation theory to test three hypotheses about a) public interest, b) de jure independence, and c) de facto independence. It identifies the delegation of political independence as a key factor, but also highlights the importance of extending existing analytical schemes to include the ordinary bureaucracy in order to gain a full picture of day-to-day autonomy. A common theme identified in all three hypothesis was the agency board’s determination to proactively pursue independence, pointing to the need for further research on the strategies employed by regulatory agencies to forge autonomy.

Author

• Florentine Koppenborg, Technical University of Munich