Varieties of MAD and the Logic of Nuclear Deterrence

• In Event: Nuclear Deterrence

Abstract

Despite its endurance as a prominent theory of deterrence, the concept and implications of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) remains contested. Champions of MAD derive the optimistic conclusion that the fear of escalation to nuclear war will sustain a perpetual nuclear standoff. Critics, on the other hand, fear that the logic of MAD does not guarantee such a standoff, implying that the possession of robust nuclear arsenals will inevitability lead to a crisis involving their usage. In order to examine these competing claims, we present a quadripartite categorization for understanding the logic and implications of MAD theory. Utilizing a game theoretic perspective, we use this Varieties of MAD (vMAD) framework to consider how conditions both require and render impossible specific equilibria. We find that a MAD world in which perpetual mutual restraint represents the only rational outcome requires impractical and potentially unverifiable assumptions regarding the status quo. However, a MAD world in which both nuclear standoff and even nuclear war are rational equilibria can be tempered by additional mechanisms – e.g., the red phone, arms control – that communicate the respective players’ utility for preferring the status quo, thus minimizing the probability of nuclear conflict. We accompany our game theoretic explanation with a historical overview of the US-Soviet Union nuclear relationship to illustrate the dynamic nature of MAD.

Authors

• Jeremy Graham, National Defense University

• Zi En Kimberly Peh, University of Notre Dame