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Does democratization of civil-military relations through ‘coup-proofing’ improve democracy or lead to hybrid regimes entrenching in authoritarian governance? How does disinformation play into triggering co-option and repression of contentious political actors? Democratizing regimes strive to reduce the influence of the military over politics. Extant research examines the structural coup-proofing measures and institutional reform to explain coup risk. I contend that democratizing hybrid regimes that reduce power-sharing with military risk face a reverse outcome: democratic backsliding. Democratization allows the government to abandon power-sharing and purge military officers from the government and outright from the military. However, this creates a vacuum in which authoritarian leaders can easily find space to backslide and adopt the co-optation of loyalists and coup-related repression, easing the authoritarian power grab supported by political disinformation campaigns. I test this theory using process tracing methods on a qualitative case study on Turkey over the past two decades and find support for the theory.