The Perfectionist Basis of Green’s Liberalism

• In Event: Liberalism and Democracy in 18th and 19th Century British and French Thought

Abstract

The perfectionist basis of Green's liberalism

T.H. Green's reputation as a political thinker is based on two pillars that are at odds with each other. On the one hand we see his professorial lectures on The Principles of Political Obligation (PPO); on the other hand, we know of his involvement in a number of practical political issues of his time.

The concept of political obligation (PO) functions as a political shell around the system of moral philosophy, as set out in Prolegomena to Ethics. It addresses the question of the basis of the authority of the law to bring about certain forms of behavior with mandatory regulation and, if necessary, make people comply to these rules through coercion and sanctions. PO therefore works in principle differently from moral duty, which by its nature is unenforceable. PO undermines moral duty.

On the other hand, Green's political theory cannot be separated from his involvement and efforts in practical political issues of his time. A natural introduction to this aspect of his political thought is his lecture on Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract which he gave to the Liberal Association in Leicester in 1881. It was in this context that Green introduced the concept of 'positive freedom' so as to contrast it with the previous interpretation of that label as 'negative freedom'.

The Liberal agenda in the second half of the nineteenth century consisted of reforms aimed at countering restrictions on citizens' freedoms and opportunities, especially when these forms of state intervention reinforced class privileges. These Liberal involvements manifested themselves, for example, in the repeal of the Corn Laws, resistance to religious persecution and various electoral reforms. Suffrage was extended in three rounds during the 19th century.

Previous liberals were of the opinion that reforms should be limited to 'the removal of obstacles', in the form of state interference with individual freedom. These Old Liberals, such as Herbert Spencer, stood for individualism and laissez-faire. In contrast, the New Liberals believed that political reforms should be complemented by social and economic reforms in labor, education, and health care to achieve greater equality. These new reforms required interference with individual freedoms by the state.

In the majority of existing commentaries on Green's moral and political philosophy, the division between PO and positive freedom is insufficiently recognized and certainly not satisfactorily explained. To the extent that the discord is recognized at all, scholars of Green's political theory (including Brink, 2003; Carritt, 1935; Dimova-Cookson, 2019; Gaus, 2000; Harris & Morrow, 1986; Milne, 1968; Nicholson, 1990; Simhony & Weinstein, 2001; and Tyler, 2010, 2012) without exception, envisage a key role for an essay that was made public under the title 'On the different senses of "freedom" as applied to will and to the moral progress of man' and that originated in notes for his tutorial lectures on Kant. This manuscript was ignored by A.C. Bradley, the editor of his book on moral philosophy, for the final edition of the Prolegomena in 1883, but it was used by the editor of his collected Works, R.L. Nettleship, as an introduction to the professorial lectures on political obligation in part II. Since then it has been invariably linked to and used as an introduction to Green's political theory. For example, it was included in the separate edition of PPO by Bernard Bosanquet at Longmans in 1917 and has since been inextricably linked to the interpretation of Green's political theory.

In this paper I will argue that the essay "Different senses" has misled most of the scholars who have commented on Green's political theory thus far. The division into three forms of freedom, i.e. legal, moral and real freedom, has inspired some to further theorize the relationship between the three forms. However, these diagrams do not match Green's work as we know it. Nor do they shed further light on the contrast between positive and negative freedom that Green uses to justify the potentially problematic category of new liberal legislation.

I want to show that a direct and much more convincing connection can be made between the practical project for a redefinition of the concept of freedom and his academic political theory by developing a common ground of both elements with the perfectionist basis of Green's liberalism. Green aspired to solve a problem that has come to be known in more recent political economic literature as the problem of collective action, in spite of the fact that Green of course did not yet have this vocabulary at his disposal. His conceptualization of the relationship between politics and ethics sheds a new and inspiring lens on the contemporary problem of compliance.

Author

• Ben Wempe, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University