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In this paper, I theorize and empirically analyze the determinants of individual attitudes towards redistribution from the superrich in time of war in the context of a developing democracy. In line with compensatory theories that have been inspired by the wartime experience of Western countries in the 20th century, I posit that public attitudes towards redistribution follow a compensatory logic—for their sacrifice at the frontlines, ordinary citizens demand compensation from the state in the form of redistribution from the rich. However, I also argue that public attitudes are further shaped by individual oligarchs’ wartime behavior and background characteristics, including their past relationship with the state. I test my theory with an original conjoint survey experiment conducted in Ukraine during Russia’s full-scale invasion. The study aims to contribute to our understanding of public support for redistribution during wartime, public support for the superrich, and oligarch survival in the context of developing democracies, all areas of research that have received little scholarly attention to date.