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Aristotle is not often considered a foundational thinker for realism; rather, he is seen as a poster child for politics as the foundation for the “good life.” While not denying that for Aristotle politics is in part aimed at living well, this paper argues that Aristotle’s confrontation with the problems of actual political orders belies a direct political application of the principles of the Ethics and shows instead a politically realist aspect to Aristotle’s thought. In Book 5 of the Politics, where Aristotle most directly addresses the problems of actual regimes, Aristotle provides advice for the stabilization and preservation of every kind of political regime, regardless of whether those regimes are ones he has characterized in Book 3 as oriented around “living” simply, which is compatible with a regime’s being organized only around rulers’ advantage, or “living well,” which is associated with justice as the common advantage. Nowhere in Book 5 does Aristotle suggest that “higher-minded,” virtuous citizens can or should aim to change their regimes, even those regimes that aim only at the advantage of rulers, into something more oriented toward “living well” through means of factional conflict. In other words, Aristotle’s approach to real regimes prioritizes regime order and stability over justice. Like some contemporary realists and the early modern realists often thought to be rejecting his approach (Machiavelli, Hobbes, etc.), Aristotle sees political order as a vulnerable achievement in itself worth preserving. However, at the same time, his advice in Book 5 to rulers of regimes reveals that typically, internal reforms to stabilize regimes will also more fully align them with the advantage of all, rather than merely the advantage of rulers. Thus, on Aristotle’s account, the demands of stability roughly approximate the demands of justice.