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While much discussion of Ukraine’s ability and incentives to bargain or continue fighting in their war with Russia focuses on external constraints (i.e., foreign military aid), we know little about how domestic political constraints shape possibilities for negotiated settlement or continued fighting. Costs are thought to reduce support for continued fighting. However, negotiated settlements that are unacceptable to much of the populace also are unlikely to be pursued by a country’s leadership in a conflict. It is also unclear how much public opinion takes into consideration international pressures and strategic concerns that tend to dominate elite discussions of Ukraine’s options. To examine public opinion on war outcomes, we collected original survey data (both experimental and observational) in Ukraine in two rounds in late 2022 and early 2024. By intentionally sampling internally displaced people, who disproportionately come from regions that are occupied or near the fighting, we are able produce national and regional coverage comparable to that achieved in survey samples prior to the 2022 invasion despite the impossibility of conducting survey work in some regions. This paper examines Ukrainian public opinion on foreign aid, preferred and possible war outcomes, and how personal costs of war and potential changes in the tide of the war influence those beliefs and preferences. We find that personal experiences of higher costs of war produce more resistance to negotiated settlement, rather than reducing resolve to continue fighting. Priming respondents to think of potential military successes increases beliefs that bargaining is unnecessary and undesirable but does not increase confidence in the provision of aid from the West. Priming respondents to think of potential military losses does not change willingness to compromise but changes domestic spending priorities and increases confidence in Western military support. In the context of a domestic, defensive war, costs and prospects influence public opinion differently than previous findings in other kinds of conflict settings. Even if the Ukrainian leadership is willing to bargain to a negotiated settlement, as may be necessary if Western aid diminishes, Ukrainian public opinion may make that a politically costly choice domestically.