Strategic Delegation, Federalism, and Bureaucratic Accountability

• In Event: The Relationship between the Legislature and Other Political Institutions

Abstract

Congressional delegation of authority increasingly relies on states and federal agencies to implement policy. Concurrently, Congress has developed a variety of tools, including creative and evolving uses of administrative structure, to induce these intergovernmental agents to administer delegated authority in alignment with legislative preferences. Yet the inclusion of states as delegatees introduces a wider range of preferences into the political calculus and increases the likelihood that agents will be pulled in competing directions, potentially diminishing the value of delegation. Alternatively, there may be times when these complicated dynamics offer strategic advantages to Congress. We explore these complexities and assess when Congress relies on the states as a supplement to other forms of political control of administrative action. Utilizing measures of intergovernmental delegation, agency independence, and judicial exposure, we demonstrate that congressional delegation to the states hinges on federal factors, including the independence of federal administrative agencies and the availability of judicial review of administrative action. Our findings have broad implications, suggesting that the intergovernmental relationships created when Congress delegates to the states not only affect constitutional conceptions of federalism, but also the functioning of the American separation of powers system.

Authors

• Pamela Clouser McCann, University of Southern California

• Jennifer L. Selin, Arizona State University