The Resource Dilemma- Migration and Development in South Africa

• In Event: Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Borders, and Migration

Abstract

How do governments allocate resources to different migrant groups? Why are some bureaucracies more effective in allocating resources to migrants and others not? What explains the bureaucratic hurdles immigrants often face when interacting with the state? My research suggests the following hypotheses: local governments are more likely to respond to different migrant groups when these grievances are motivated by ethnic tension; bureaucracies in urban areas are less effective in allocating resources to migrants in host countries when those migrants are relatively poor as opposed to rich and or if these migrants are internal rather than external. Political patronage, race, and clientelism are likely to contribute towards allocation of resources. As a result of bureaucratic inefficiencies in allocation of resources we often see efforts of political mobilization by both locals and migrant groups.

Archival data shows that following the discovery of gold and diamonds in 1890, the city attracted migrant labour internally and from across the African continent. African migrants were offered preferential employment, services, and housing from the colonial and apartheid governments relative to black South Africans. As a result, this led to an increase in ethnic tension and violence amongst migrant and natives particularly in the migrant housing compounds and townships. This paper considers the following localities. Cape Town, London, New Delhi, Amsterdam, Berlin, and Jakarta. This set of cases allows me to examine countries with strong and weak states, and legal regimes that give migrants different rights and time. These cities are all major bureaucratic administrations and have attracted economic migrants internally and externally. In addition to economic migration all the mentioned localities have a large refugee population.

Author

• Yusuf Bulbulia, University of Toronto