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This paper will offer an account of the distinctly normative set of liberal commitments, which depict the “good liberal character” that Shklar describes in Ordinary Vices. Although scholars have observed that Shklar provides a character-based account of liberalism (Cherniss, 2022) this seems in tension with the procedural account of liberalism found in the “Liberalism of Fear” that rejects it as a “philosophy of life” (Shklar, 1989). To reconcile these two seemingly incompatible perspectives, I contend that Shklar, in her emphasis on political pluralism, simultaneously provides an account of what a good liberal ought to do as a member of a political community. This includes not only putting cruelty first but a realistic perspective on political life alongside efforts to reduce injustice. These normative commitments, I argue, emerge most saliently through Shklar’s integration of literature into her works which provide further insight into her approach to liberal political theory.