Scheduling Coups: Election Calendar and Coup Risk in Autocracies

• In Event: Political Behavior under Electoral Authoritarianism

Abstract

How do election calendars affect coup risk in autocracies? Although prior literature suggests that recent elections are associated with coup risk, this article shows that the relationship between elections and coups is much richer than previously assumed. Drawing on evidence from original data on election schedules and coup types in all autocracies from 1946 to 2010, we find that upcoming elections – which are scheduled but not yet held – significantly increase coup risk. Moreover, the occurrence of the first election in a regime reduces the risk of leader reshuffling coups while it increases the risk of regime change coups. In general, autocracies having held at least one election in their history are less vulnerable to coup attempts than closed autocracies and autocracies whose first election was not held yet.

Authors

• Jia Li, Utah State University

• John Joseph Chin, Carnegie Mellon University