What Makes Deterrence Work? A Perspective of Poliheuristic Theory

• In Event: Poster Session: International Security Theory and Concepts

Abstract

Many studies have shown that irrationality plays a role in deterrence, challenging the rationality assumed by classical deterrence theory. Under what conditions will irrationality affect the effectiveness of deterrence? This paper argues that the two-stage decision process and non-compensatory principle applied in the decision-making process postulated by the poliheuristic theory can retain some views of classical deterrence theory, and reformulate it. This paper uses the poliheuristic theory to analyze the effectiveness of deterrence in different situations. Two cases are used to test this theory: Japan’s decision to attack Pearl Harbor in 1941, and Mainland China’s decision to launch massive military exercises in the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. This paper concludes that when there are poliheuristic choice set among all parties in the deterrence relationship, irrationality will affect the effectiveness of deterrence. This also suggests that the existence of poliheuristic choice set in the challenger in deterrence means that the success of deterrence depends more on reassurance rather than communicating the resolve to the challenger and the capability of the defender; if the defender in the deterrence has a poliheuristic choice set, then this means that the defender has a high degree of credibility to implement its deterrence.

Author

• Ruiqi Zhou, Shanghai University