Congressional Oversight Out of Sight: The House Appropriations Committee and the Arc of Congressional Competence

• In Event: American Political Development

Abstract

Full title: Congressional Oversight Out of Sight: The House Appropriations Committee and the Arc of Congressional Competence

During the 20th Century Congress built capacity to balance the growing information demands of governing an expanding state. But in recent years that capacity has been buffeted by partisan polarization. This article follows the history of the House Appropriations Committee’s Surveys & Investigations (S&I) staff as it grew from two FBI agents loaned by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to Appropriations Chairman Clarence Cannon into an enduring oversight institution with a reputation for neutral, under-the-radar investigations. S&I’s growth and institutionalization in the years following World War II; the apex of its investigative activity during the 1980’s; and, in recent decades, its resilience in an increasingly volatile institutional environment illuminate the interplay of agency oversight and committee autonomy in the organization of congressional policymaking. Through archival research and new data tracking S&I reports by appropriations subcommittee between 1970 and 2010, this paper offers new perspective on the 20th century development and decline of congressional capacity (LaPira, Drutman, Kosar 2020). Unobserved by institutional design, S&I’s narratives of oversight out of sight elevate process and contingency and illuminate what is omitted by empirical theories of congressional delegation and oversight.

Author

• Matthew M. Dull, Virginia Tech