How Do Lawyers Affect Autocratic Rule? Experimental Evidence from China

• In Event: Authoritarian Statecraft 2.0

Abstract

This paper explores the interaction between the rule of law and autocratic rule in authoritarian regimes, focusing on the role of legal professionals. Despite extensive literature on legal institutions, the influence of lawyers in environments with weak institutions remains understudied. This research addresses this gap through parallel survey experiments involving 1,152 Chinese lawyers and 2,000 Chi- nese citizens of the general public. The study reveals that lawyers help mediate tensions between the public and courts, particularly when public knowledge of the law is limited. It also finds that dis- advantaged groups prefer politically connected and elite lawyers who can champion the rule of law against authorities. Additionally, the paper examines the effects of different motivational messages (political vs. professional) on lawyers’ willingness to offer pro bono services to the underprivileged. Results indicate that professional incentives, rather than political directives, foster legal activism and participation in state-controlled legal aid. However, lawyers are not significantly mobilized for po- litical participation, allowing autocrats to mitigate potential challenges. The research also uncovers biases in the mobilization of the rule of law under authoritarianism, favoring less elite, junior lawyers without political connections, and those with authoritarian leanings. The findings elucidate why the expansion of China’s legal community and market does not necessarily enhance the rule of law or democratization. This study contributes to understanding the complex dynamics between the state, legal professionals, and the public under authoritarian legality.

Author

• Ziwen Zu