Loyalty, Productivity and Service: Legislative Candidate Selection in Ghana

• In Event: The Relationship between the Public and Parliament

Abstract

A key feature of First-Past-the-Post electoral systems is the abundance of safe seats, heightening the relevance of internal party candidate selection processes. In such systems, since re-selection is invariably re-election in many constituencies, actual competition for parliamentary seats happen within instead of between parties. Yet despite the pivotal role party elites play in selecting legislators, and the adoption of party primaries in many emerging democracies in Africa, we know only little, both theoretically and empirically, about these selectorates, their composition and preferences as well as the exact aspects of MPs’ work they reward. Again, explanations that underpin their preferences remain a black box in Africa’s emerging democracies. Drawing on interviews with MPs and with local party delegates in Ghana – one of Africa’s most successful democracies, the paper argues that party elites prefer candidates who deliver targeted patronage, demonstrate productivity in the parliamentary arena and deliver service to constituents. However, there are variations along the dimensions of constituency-specific electoral vulnerability and the party’s status in government. Success in candidate selection within political parties in power is hinged on party loyalty, demonstrable by the provision of targeted patronage to core party elites at the grassroots. Conversely, elites in opposition parties return MPs who rather demonstrate legislative productivity. In electorally marginal constituencies, however, internal party selection focuses on active constituency service beyond elite loyalty.

Author

• Martin Acheampong, German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA)