Presidential Appointments and Regulatory Review as Strategic Substitutes

• In Event: New Perspectives on the Political Control of the Bureaucracy

Abstract

Presidents use a variety of tools and strategies to (attempt to) shape the behavior of bureaucratic policymakers. Two of the most frequently-studied tools for bureaucratic control include centralized regulatory review, and politicization of agencies through appointments. Extensive literatures in political science investigate the use of these tools in isolation, exploring the conditions under which presidents are more likely to use appointments or to request changes to agencies’ proposed rules. In this paper, I argue that the tools of presidential management should be considered not only in isolation, but also in combination as components of a comprehensive administrative strategy. In particular, I test whether the use of political appointments informs patterns of post-hoc regulatory review. Using appointments data compiled from the Office of Personnel Management and regulatory review information from Reginfo.gov, I find that an agency having more appointees is associated with fewer of that agency's rules being changed by OIRA, suggesting that politicization through appointments can be a strategic substitute for post-hoc regulatory review.

Author

• Annie Benn, Colgate University