How Autocratic Elections Regulate Access to Executive Power

• In Event: Political Parties in Transitional Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes

Abstract

Scholars of competitive authoritarianism have long argued that elections can stabilize autocratic regimes by facilitating more credible power-sharing and regulating access to positions of power. However, prior research has not empirically investigated this phenomenon concerning access to the highest level of government – the cabinet. Using individual-level data on cabinet members worldwide during the period 1966-2021, this article is the first to empirically study how elections shape access to the cabinet in autocratic regimes. The analysis reveals a nuanced relationship between elections and access to the cabinet. Contrary to longstanding arguments, elections appear to have only a limited effect on entries to and exits from the cabinet for members belonging to the same party as the dictator. However, elections strongly influence entries to and exits from the cabinet for members affiliated with parties other than that of the incumbent, or in regimes where the incumbent does not belong to any party themselves. This indicates that elections primarily facilitate power-sharing between the ruling party and opposition parties, while they do not substantially affect access to power within the ruling party.

Author

• Jonas Willibald Schmid