Pre-independence Elites and Post-colonial Selectorates: Evidence from the MENA

• In Event: The Evolution of Authoritarian Governance: Strategies, Ideology, and Institutions

Abstract

Elites play a decisive role in the formation and survival of political regimes. These studies are largely silent, however, regarding how formerly colonized regimes manage pre-independence elites in the process of consolidating post-colonial selectorates. This question is particularly germane to the study of decolonizing autocracies, as elites associated with colonial rule may either enjoy incumbent advantages or present reputational liabilities for post-colonial regimes during the regime consolidation period. I argue that pre-independence elites play a decisive and under-explored role in the governance of decolonizing regimes, even when such regimes came to power through anti-colonial revolutions. I document these patterns using the method of prosopography to collect comprehensive biographies of precolonial, colonial, and post-independence executive elites (ministers) as an observable measure of regime selectorates in Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco. I then use time series and network analysis to examine individual and cabinet-level changes across critical junctures like independence, war, civil unrest, and regime change. Preliminary results suggest that ancien elites may be cyclically reappointed during times of crisis across regime and colonizer types. The findings from my analysis of elite biography data across autocracies with diverse institutional features suggest that disaggregating selectorates may help us better refine our understanding of macro-institutional dynamics like regime change.

Author

• Allison Spencer Hartnett, University of Southern California