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Can political elites make democratic transgressions more acceptable to voters? Previous research emphasizes the importance of partisan loyalty and affective polarisation that lead voters to overlook democratic transgressions by co-partisans. Examining the Czech case, we evaluate three different causal mechanisms that might be underpinning this effect. First, elite cues may veil democratic transgressions, leading voters to be less able to recognize them as such. Second, affective polarization may lead voters to discount transgressions when they enable their preferred party to remain in power. Finally, elite cues may change voters’ perceptions of the relative importance of other policies over democracy, resulting in a policy trade-off. Using a vignette experiment, our study probes the effect of a range of elite justifications upon voters’ willingness to discount democratic transgressions proposed by their preferred party. In doing so, our study explores the role of elite cues in democratic backsliding and fills an important gap in the literature on voter tolerance of democratic transgressions.