Spiral Model or Deterrence Model? Explaining China’s Policy toward the U.S.

• In Event: Sino-American Competition

Abstract

This article critically reassesses the “security dilemma” narrative in the analysis of the U.S.-China rivalry. The prevalent paradigm attributes China’s assertive foreign policy to reactive responses to perceived hostility, mainly from the United States, and suggests accommodation by the U.S. can temper China’s actions. I contend that this interpretation rests on a misunderstanding of U.S.-China Cold War era cases.

By examining primary sources of two key cases —the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis and China’s Vietnam War strategy in the 1960s—this study suggests that China’s actions were not merely reactive to U.S. assertiveness, but rather resulted from Chinese leaders’ perceptions that the U.S. would avoid direct military conflict with China. Utilizing Robert Jervis’s complex-systems framework, the study explores how various factors at the international and domestic systemic levels shaped Chinese leaders’ strategic decisions in the late 1950s to 1960s. It reveals how Mao’s evolving perception of the international environment, including declining U.S. military threats, narrowing power gaps with major powers, and China’s enhanced international status, prompted a more aggressive stance against the United States.

The article also illustrates the relevance of the complex-systems framework in analyzing Xi Jinping’s strategic approach to the Indo-Pacific region.

Author

• (Clark) Aoqi Wu, Department of Politics, The Catholic University of America