Electoral Cycles in Climate Policy and National Renewable Energy Mixes

• In Event: Incumbents and Veto Players in the Politics of Climate Change

Abstract

Despite the multitude of international and national pledges of Net Zero Emissions by 2050, few large national economies are likely to meet them, and analysts are hard-pressed to explain how and whether nations might decarbonize. This article shows, for the first time, the existence of an “electoral connection” and political business cycles relating to climate policy; that national executives in their last terms in office design more ambitious decarbonization policies for the longer term. We argue that last-term executives can focus less on immediate interest group and constituency demands needed for re-election and more on their own ethics and legacies. Our statistical evidence is robust when we test the effects of the executive’s last term on renewable energy generation and capacity across 160 national economies. We conclude by advocating for term limits, or at least for insulating climate policy-making executives from the short-term imperatives of workaday interest group pressures.

Authors

• Todd A. Eisenstadt, American University

• Le Bao, City University of Hong Kong

• Jennifer Lopez, American University

• Cindy Ragab, American University