Revisionism by Other Means: Chinese and Russian International Media Strategies

• In Event: Chinese and Russian Information Warfare

Abstract

While previous research on challenges to international order by revisionist powers has often emphasized military, economic, and institutional strategies—domains where status-quo powers have disproportionate advantages—there is a need for greater focus on areas of potential asymmetric advantage, such as information strategies. Furthermore, existing studies often analyze these powers' policies in isolation. Understanding whether and why their approaches differ is necessary to develop better theories of revisionist strategies, and to craft better policies when China and Russia appear to be mounting increasingly assertive challenges to the Liberal International Order and align on many issues.
This study addresses these gaps by conducting a comparative analysis of English-language state media from Russia and China. It compares their policies on information and media since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 and the narratives that they have promoted since this time. The focus is on comparing their English language state media coverage of American interventions abroad as well events which might cause their interests to be in tension, such as Russian involvement in Ukraine since 2014.
The findings show that the purposes for which they appear to use their media diverge significantly and are sometimes at loggerheads. Both show a shared interest in challenging American leadership and foreign policy, but Russian narratives show a disregard for international norms and promote rampant disinformation, Chinese media are more reluctant to use disinformation outside of what they see as domestic issues and have focused extensively on defending norms of territorial integrity and state sovereignty, challenging other norms most strongly when they come into conflict with the former.
This paper argues that the cause for such divergence rests in the relationships between their territorial ambitions and the territorial integrity norm. States that are dissatisfied with the territorial status quo and have significant parts of what they see as their national homeland outside of their control will try to use information and media to shape international norms to facilitate their ambitions. When a part of their territory is outside of their control but internationally recognized as part of their nation, they are incentivized to support territorial integrity and sovereignty norms to enable policies aimed at unification or preventing separation. In contrast, if the territory is outside of their borders incentives favor undermining international norms that would make efforts to annex territory or control foreign governments in the region.
The People’s Republic of China under the Chinese Communist Party sees Taiwan as central to its national identity and as such maintains a strong interest in preventing Taiwanese independence and garnering international support for the idea that Taiwan is a part of China, it has attempted to use its media and influence over information to defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty norms, seeking a new hierarchy of norms where those norms supersede all others. Russia though, seeking to assert a sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union, has sought to challenge territorial integrity, sovereignty and democracy norms to create division among NATO and to limit the legitimacy costs of its actions in Ukraine and the broader region.

Author

• Erik Alexander Underwood, McGill University