Deterrence-Assurance Tradeoff: US-China Security Dilemma in the Taiwan Strait

• In Event: Sino-American Competition

Abstract

Why has the United States’ policy of strategic ambiguity failed to deter Beijing’s escalating military coercion against Taiwan since 2017? How can the US effectively deter Beijing’s coercion and potential attack on Taiwan, avoid conflict with China over Taiwan, and maintain stability in the Taiwan Strait? This paper proposes a new theory of deterrence and assurance by theorizing the inherent tradeoff between deterrence and assurance to explain these puzzling questions. It argues that there is an inherent tradeoff between deterrence and assurance because states must give up at least some deterrence credibility and capability to gain assurance credibility and capability. When the security dilemma between the defender (US) and the challenger (China) is more unstable, the deterrence-assurance tradeoff becomes more salient, and deterrence is less likely to succeed. When the security dilemma between the defender and the challenger is more stable, the deterrence-assurance tradeoff becomes less salient, and deterrence is more likely to succeed. U.S.-China relations since 2017 reflect increasing uncertainties and instabilities. Therefore, each side suffers from a pronouncing deterrence-assurance tradeoff, where the two must give up high deterrence credibility and capability to effectively assure each other as well as high assurance credibility to effectively deter each other. A comparative case analysis of China's military actions in the Taiwan Strait shows as the US-China security dilemma worsens, the two sides do not trade off sufficient deterrence for assurance. Instead they pursued more deterrence credibility and capability. Consequently, China has increased coercion against Taiwan to test US resolve, and US deterrence on China’s coercion has not succeeded.

Author

• Weining Ai, University of Oklahoma