The Economic Sanction Peace between Non-democracies

• In Event: Economic Sanctions and Retaliation

Abstract

The Democratic Peace Theory stands as a prominent discussion in understanding war and peace dynamics. This theory postulates that the internal workings of a democratic regime significantly shape a nation's foreign policy, arguing that nations sharing democratic principles refrain from warring with each other. Moreover, an offshoot of this theory, termed the Democratic Economic Peace Theory, posits that heightened economic interdependence among democratic nations reduces reliance on coercive measures beyond military force, such as economic sanctions.
From these discussions, the Democratic Peace Theory has expanded into a general principle, asserting that nations embracing democratic systems not only avoid hostile actions in conventional military realms but also extend this trend into economic domains.
However, in contrast to democracy, what about non-democratic regimes? Some arguments have suggested peace among non-democratic states akin to the Democratic Peace Theory's context. Yet, studies on peace among non-democratic states have been notably limited on a macroscopic scale, with a scarcity of micro-level research focused on specific areas like economic sanctions. With the recent Russia-Ukraine conflict and the emergence of value-based alliances, a trend of fractionalization between the dominant camps of democracy and authoritarianism is accelerating. This emphasizes the urgent need to shed light on and clarify the solidarity and unity among non-democratic states—a concept insufficiently addressed in previous research, essentially termed non-democratic peace.
Given this research background and the pressing need, this study aims to validate the existence of economic peace among non-democratic states by addressing questions such as Do non-democratic states reciprocally impose sanctions? Do non-democratic states exhibit lower likelihoods of sanctions compared to other regime types?
The findings of this paper affirm the presence of economic peace among non-democratic states. Regardless of the timeframe, non-democratic states demonstrate reduced probabilities of reciprocally imposing sanctions compared to other regime types. It suggests that such states are less inclined to enforce mutual sanctions both during and after the Cold War era, with marginal changes observed even following the rise of China.

Author

• Yue Ma, Yonsei University