Chinese Aid and Human Rights Lobbying at the United Nations

• In Event: Poster Session: International Collaboration & Canadian Politics
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: International Collaboration

Abstract

Does China use its foreign aid to lobby at the United Nations? In this paper, we investigate whether and how China utilizes its foreign aid politically at various institutions of the UN, including the UN Security Council, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), and the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Theoretically, we propose two alternative scenarios. First, China may utilize foreign aid to keep currently friendly countries to its side. Thus, we propose the “rewarding friends” hypothesis suggesting that China will mainly distribute its foreign aid to countries that are already friendly to them and countries that are voting similarly at the UNGA. China is also less likely to increase aid to non-permanent members at the UNSC, as countries elected to the UNSC are usually those that garner support from the US and other Western countries. Second, China may use foreign aid to change the status quo in international politics. If this “buying support” is the case, then China will distribute more foreign aid to countries that are a priori distant to it at the UNGA and countries that are elected to serve as non-permanent members at the UNSC. Third, when it comes to the UNHRC, we propose that given the distinct dynamics of the UNHRC and China’s concerns and interests over human rights issues, we expect that China will provide more aid to countries that are elected to serve as council members, especially for the ones who have maintained similar positions at the UNGA. Utilizing the existing Chinese aid datasets, our statistical analysis provides empirical support for the rewarding friends hypothesis: countries that maintain similar voting patterns at the UNGA receive more aid from China; countries that serve at the UNSC as non-permanent members receive less aid from China. We also show that China disburses more aid to countries that are elected to serve at the UNHRC, especially for those that maintain similar voting patterns at the UNGA.

Authors

• Byungwon Woo, Yonsei University

• Su-Hyun Lee, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore