The National Guard: A Military Institution to Resolve Multiple Social Dilemmas

• In Event: The Diversity of Public Administration

Abstract

We understand the U.S. Constitution as an institution capable of addressing and resolving multiple collective problems. We evaluate the U.S. National Guard as an example of such an institution. This allows us to reframe the debate and broaden our understanding of this uniquely American institution to see that it is both an institution and tool of federalism. Existing scholarship on the National Guard focuses on warfighting as its primary (or only) goal. Similarly, previous scholarship considers the National Guard as subservient to political exigencies—a product of federalism—or special interest group politics. But these characterizations are also used to explain its weak capacity for war fighting. That is, previous scholarship takes an institution asked to address a broad set of social dilemmas and narrows it down to understanding through one dilemma. But we argue the National Guard has continually evolved over time to address various social dilemmas arising between multiple veto players, which include governors, the president, and Congress. Accordingly, we show how these actors lean on the National Guard to address social dilemmas regarding warfighting, security cooperation, and aid for state-level civilian authorities in situations like natural disasters or the collapse of law and order. Consequently, a look at the historical development of the National Guard provides a window into how Americans decided to address a variety of collective action problems over the course of U.S. history.

Authors

• Vasabjit Banerjee, University of Tennessee, Knoxville

• Sean Webeck, Defense Security Cooperation University