Fading Out: Persistent Stalemates and Informal Peace after Civil War

• In Event: Unconventional Victories: Origins, Consequences, and Resilience of Rebel Success

Abstract

Why do some civil war stalemates result in lasting informal peace? Existing research suggests that decisive victories or negotiated settlements in civil conflict provide greater chances for lasting peace. Yet, most civil conflicts “fade out” rather than conclude formally. We have limited understanding of the conditions that make certain actors more likely to cease violence rather than fight to the bitter end. I argue that conflicts that fade out can mark the beginning of persistent stalemates in which state and nonstate actors settle into lasting coexistence with low levels of hostilities. Using data on conflict episodes between 1970 and 2018, I show that persistent stalemates are neither more violent nor less stable than other forms of conflict termination. Estimating survival and competitive risk models, I find that the character of actors’ war aims, and the nature of post-war institutions shape the probability that informal peace lasts. This research advances our understanding of the conditions that make such informal peace last. More research is necessary to explore the arrangements that emerge where state and nonstate actors persist side-by-side without formal peace agreements.

Author

• Wendy Wagner, University of California San Diego