Deterrence or Provocation? Effects of Strategic Clarity on Conflict over Taiwan

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Abstract

The U.S. has traditionally adhered to a policy of “strategic ambiguity,” avoiding explicit commitments to defend Taiwan. Nonetheless, this stance faces challenges, as some experts advocate for “strategic clarity,” wherein the U.S. explicitly commits to responding to any Chinese use of force against Taiwan. Motivated by this policy debate on strategic ambiguity and clarity, this paper asks: Will a policy of strategic clarity deter, provoke, or have no effect on China? Despite this ongoing debate over whether strategic ambiguity or clarity is the more effective strategy to avert conflicts with China, there is a notable absence of empirical research on the potential outcomes of a policy shift toward strategic clarity. To address this gap, we propose the first parallel survey experiments in China and the U.S. We argue that strategic clarity will have different effects in the U.S. and China. Within the U.S., proponents of this policy anticipate that it will signal the U.S. resolve across the Taiwan Strait and, consequently, discourage China from engaging in hostile actions toward Taiwan. In contrast, we anticipate that strategic clarity, in fact, fails to dissuade China from pursuing an assertive foreign policy towards Taiwan. We propose parallel survey experiments in China and the U.S. in which we present an identical survey instrument to both Chinese and American citizens. This research project offers a fresh perspective on the varied interpretations of strategic clarity policy.

Authors

• Weifang Xu, Florida State University

• Mark Souva, Florida State University