Political Polarization and Coups d’Etat

• In Event: Civil-Military Relations in a Changing Society: Institutions and Interests

Abstract

The twenty-first century has witnessed a globally rising tide of political polarization. Scholars tie this growing polarization to declines in governance performance, owing to legislative gridlock or partisan animosity. But under what circumstances does polarization not only undermine the effectiveness of political institutions but threaten their very existence via coups d’état and regime transitions? Employing historical, cross-national data, this paper tests the relationship between political polarization and coups, finding that mass polarization can be an important factor in regime breakdown and democratic decline. In the paper, we investigate two distinct explanatory variables: affective polarization, which reflects animosity between supporters of opposing political camps, and preference polarization, which refers to the magnitude of difference between opposing political opinions. Our empirical strategy relies on large-n, cross-national panel data. For data on mass polarization, we rely on the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, which offers measures of affective and preference polarization in society since 1950 and 2000, respectively. Our primary source of coup data comes from Powell and Thyne (2011), who provide a comprehensive global list of coup attempts and outcomes over the study period. Additional data from Albrecht et al. (2021) differentiates coups led by junior versus senior military officers. We hypothesize that higher polarization in mass preferences will be associated with more frequent coup attempts. Where political opponents disagree strongly on major policy questions, the armed forces may be more likely to intervene to “overrule” election outcomes or policy decisions that run counter to their own preferences. By contrast, we hypothesize that higher affective polarization will increase the likelihood of coup success, conditional on an attempt, because a divided public will be less capable of rapid counter-coup mass mobilization. Finally, we hypothesize that mass polarization will be more likely to produce coups by junior, rather than senior, military officers. Unlike senior officers, who are often closely aligned with the political elite, junior officers may share the grievances of the general public, providing a motive to intervene as polarization increases.

Authors

• Nicholas John Lotito, Princeton University

• Elizabeth R. Nugent, Princeton University